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STUDENT NOTES
STATUTES OF LIMITATION AS APPLIED TO NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS IN KENTUCKY
A frequent and perplexing problem in Kentucky practice is the
application of the statutes of limitatiQn to promissory notes. This
is due to the fact that we have two statutes of limitation which are
applicable to these instruments.
KRS 413.090 provides:
The following actions shall be commenced within fifteen years
after the cause of action first accrued .... (2) an action upon a
recognizance, bond or written contract.
KRS 413.120 provides:
The following actions shall be commenced within five years after
the cause of action accrued: ... (8) an action upon a bill of ex-
change, check, draft or order, or any endorsement thereof,
or upon a promissory note placed upon the footing of a bill of
exchange.
The court has held that a promissory note, although having all
the requisites for negotiability, is merely a written contract and
within the fifteen year statute unless it has been negotiated by the
payee to a holder in due course.' However, if there has been such a
negotiation, a note is placed upon the footing of a bill of exchange
and comes within the five-year statute. This requires that the note
be negotiated in good faith and for value before maturity.!
The problem, then, is to determine what constitutes negotiation
so as to place a note on the footing of a bill of exchange. A survey of
a number of cases illustrates the situations which have been held to
negotiate or not to negotiate a note.
The transfer of a note made payable to the cashier of a bank,
endorsed by him and placed upon the books of the bank as an asset,
when it fact it was a transaction between the maker and the bank,
is not sufficient negotiation to prevent the application of the fifteen
year statute.' However, a corporation's endorsement of a note for
value to one of its officers does negotiate it and place it upon the
footing of a bill of exchange.4
'Alexander v. West, 241 Ky. 541, 44 S.W. (2d) 518 (1931);
Richardson's Adm. v. Morgan, 233 Ky. 540, 26 S.W. (2d) 32 (1930);
Southern National Bank v. Schimpler, 160 Ky. 813, 170 S.W. 178
(1914).
-'First State Bank v. Parratt, 255 Ky. 615, 75 S.W. (2d) 46
(1934); Hazel v. McCullough, 188 Ky. 419, 222 S.W. 100 (1920).
Farmers National Bank of Glasgow v. Guthrie, 284 Ky. 583, 145
S.W. (2d) 518 (1940).
'Holt Bros. Mining Co. v. Stewart, 250 Ky. 199, 61 S.W. (2d)
1073 (1933).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The transfer of a note from one bank to another in the process
of consolidation and merger will not affect the application of the
fifteen year statute.r Likewise, if a surety pay a note for the prin-
cipal and receive the note, it is said to be a "transferred" and not
a negotiated note and still within the fifteen year statute.'
A note is not negotiated so as to bring it within the five year
statute when it is placed as collateral for another note and is re-
turned when the indebtedness is paid.' However, when the note
pledged as collateral is for a greater amount than the obligation it
secures, and the obligation is not paid at maturity, the amount of the
note sufficient to pay the defaulted obligation is held to be negotiated
and within the five year statute, while the remainder of the note
is not negotiated and within the fifteen year statute.
Reacquisition by the payee presents an interesting problem. In
Sweeny et al. v. Taylor's Executor, a note had been negotiated by
the payee and thus subjected to the five year statute. It was later
reacquired by the payee and the court held that this was sufficient
to again subject it to the fifteen year statute. This is true although
the note was retransferred to the payee after maturity. This result
is explained under the "Old Shoes" theory that one who reacquires
a negotiable instrument holds it with the same rights and subject
to the same defenses as when he originally held it. The application
of this theory provides a simple means of avoiding the five year
statute by a retransfer to the payee. Apparently, in such a case in-
volving a matured note the payee could again transfer the note to
any person, including the person from whom he reacquired it, and
the fifteen year statute would be applicable. However, this transfer
must be made to the original payee by the holder in due course
before the five year statute has run.10
Another interesting question which may arise is the effect of a
transfer by the payee through a restrictive endorsement. Since a
restrictive endorsement prohibits further negotiation of the note and
constitutes the endorsee the agent or trustee of the endorser," it can
be reasoned that the transferee of a note bearing a restricted endorse-
ment would be considered the agent of the payee and the note would
remain within the fifteen year statute. The court reached this result
in holding that a note endorsed by the payee to a third party for the
purpose of collection only remains within the fifteen year statute.2
'National Bank of Lima v. Deaton, 279 Ky. 606, 131 S.W. (2d)
495 (1939).
'Redford v. Crowe's Adm'x, 225 Ky. 142, 7 S.W. (2d) 842 (1928).
'Combs v. Salyer, 291 Ky. 592, 165 S.W. (2d) 40 (1942).
'Thomas v. Siddens, 261 Ky. 613, 88 S.W. (2d) 277 (1935).
'205 Ky. 390, 266 S.W. 665 (1924).
" See Sweeny et al v. Taylor's Exec., 205 Ky. 390 at 394, 266
S.W. 665 at 667 (1924).
KRS 356.036.
"Coleman v. Coleman's Executor, 189 Ky. 96, 224 S.W. 668
(1920).
STUDENT NOTES,
Attention is called to the fact that the rules stated above do not
apply to sureties on a negotiable instrument. A special statute in
Kentucky bars suits against sureties seven years after the cause of
action first accrued." This statute, however, does not apply to en-
dorsers." Since it is apparently immaterial whether the obligation is
negotiable or non-negotiable, a transfer of the instrument would
probably not affect the period of limitation as applied to a surety.
Several interesting problems could arise in the application of this
statute on which the writer is unable to find any authority, as, for
example, where a suit is brought against one who is a principal in
form but a surety in fact.
WILLIAM H. CONLEE
KRS 413.220.
4Stokes et al. v. Farmers and Merchants Bank of Elkton, 241
Ky. 699, 44 S.W. (2d) 837 (1931).
L. J.-7
